Corporate governance in the United States is about alleviating the conflict of interest between dispersed small shareowners and powerful controlling managers. Classic works like Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) discussed this separation of ownership and control and its consequences. Although some companies in the United States are controlled by large blockholders (for instance, Microsoft, Ford, and Wal-Mart), they are relatively few and have thus drawn less attention in the corporate governance debate (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) .
Corporate governance in continental Europe and in most of the rest of the world is fundamentally different. There, few listed companies are widely held. Instead, the typical firm in stock exchanges around the world has a dominant shareholder, usually an individual or a family, who controls the majority of the votes. Often, the controlling shareholder exercises control without owning a large fraction of the cash flow rights by using pyramidal ownership, shareholder agreements and dual classes of shares (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999 ).
These differences in ownership structure have two obvious consequences for corporate governance, as surveyed in Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) . On the one hand, dominant shareholders have both the incentive and the power to discipline management. On the other hand, concentrated ownership can create conditions for a new agency problem, because the interests of controlling and minority shareholders are not aligned.
In this essay, we begin by describing the differences in the ownership structure of companies in continental Europe (Germany, France and Italy) and in the United Kingdom and the United States. We next summarize the corporate governance issues that arise in firms with a dominant shareholder. Then, we take a look at the major European corporate scandal, Parmalat, as an extreme example of investor expropriation in a family-controlled corporation.
We outline in general the legal tools that can be used to tackle abuses by controlling shareholders. Finally, we describe the reforms enacted by France, Germany and Italy between 1991 and 2005 and assess the way in which investor protection in the three countries has changed.
Concentrated Ownership across Countries
A common measure of ownership concentration is whether one shareholder owns at least 20 percent of a company's voting rights. The first column of Table 1 shows how many of the 20 largest listed companies in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States qualify as concentrated by this standard. The numbers show that dispersed ownership is common in the US and UK and very rare in Italy, with Germany and France falling in the middle. The second column shows that, with the exception of Britain, family control is quite common even among the largest corporations. Third, pyramidal ownership is a common way of holding control in continental Europe. A pyramid is defined as an ownership structure in which the controlling shareholder exercises control of one company through ownership of at least one other listed company. As we can see in column 3, pyramidal ownership is absent in Britain and America, but found even among the top 20 corporations in France, Germany and Italy.
[Insert Table 1 approx. here] One may wonder why there are no pyramids in the US or the UK. The answer probably lies in historical differences in regulation: Morck and Yeung (2005) suggest that the taxation of inter-company dividends introduced in 1935 could explain the disappearance of pyramids in the US. According to Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2005) , the introduction of the mandatory takeover bid in 1968 may explain the disappearance of pyramids in the UK.
The difference between US and UK on the one hand and continental Europe on the other is not restricted to the largest corporations. Going by the median fraction of votes owned by the largest shareholder in all listed companies (column 4), ownership is highly As a third example, consider the ownership structure of Volkswagen AG, which has a market capitalization of about $25 billion. The largest shareholder in this company is another listed company, Porsche AG. Because Volkswagen AG also has non-voting preferred shares, Porsche AG owns 25.1 percent of the common shares but only 18.9 percent of the equity.
Notice that the 1960 Volkswagen Law caps the voting power of any shareholder at 20 percent. Hence, Porsche AG does not technically control Volkswagen AG but, as its largest shareholder, holds a blocking minority. Porsche AG in turn is controlled by the family of the company's founder, Ferdinand Porsche. The Porsche family owns 100 percent of the common (voting) shares but only 50 percent of Porsche's equity, half of which consists of preferred (non-voting) shares. Because of the combined effect of the dual classes of shares and the pyramidal structure, the Porsche family controls 25.1 percent of the votes in Volkswagen AG but owns only 9.44 percent of its cash flow rights. 
Corporate Governance in Family-Controlled Companies
On average family-controlled firms are better managed than widely held ones. In a sample of large US companies, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find a significantly higher Tobin's q for family-controlled firms (a third of their sample) than for widely held companies. Barontini and Caprio (2005) find a similar result for European companies. Tobin's q is the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement value of its assets (typically measured as the book value of the firm's assets). A higher (industry-adjusted) Tobin's q suggests that the assets are used efficiently -that is, they are worth more within the firm than in alternative uses.
These findings do not imply that family-controlled firms are always better governed than widely held ones. Family control does help to protect shareholders' interest against managerial abuses, since the controlling owner and the manager are often the same person.
Moreover, the controlling family is likely to commit more human capital to the firm and care more about its long-run value (see Bertrand and Schoar, 2006) . But families can abuse their power and use corporate resources to their own private advantage. The point is that familycontrolled companies usually have less separation of ownership and control, but the controllers (the families) are much more powerful than managers in a widely held company, because they cannot be ousted by a hostile takeover or replaced by the board of directors or by the shareholders' meeting. (Johnson et al., 2000) is the transfer of value from firms where the controlling shareholder owns a small fraction of the cash-flow rights (lower down in the pyramid) to firms where the controlling shareholder owns a large fraction of cash-flow rights (higher up in the pyramid). Value can be transferred in many ways: related-party transactions (i.e., transactions with the dominant shareholder, a director or parties associated with them) at other than arm's-length terms, the biased allocation of intangible assets and liabilities, excessive director compensation, and so on.
Self-dealing or tunnelling
A hypothetical example may help to clarify how tunnelling works. In the pyramidal group described in Figure 2 , Marco Tronchetti Provera may force Telecom Italia to buy inputs from Camfin at above market prices. This related-party transaction neither creates nor destroys value, because the loss for Telecom Italia is equal to the gain for Camfin. But Tronchetti Provera is better off, because he pockets 29.1 percent of the Camfin's gain and suffers only 0.7 percent of Telecom Italia's loss.
Controllers' power to use corporate resources to their private advantage is likely to create a wedge between the value of a company for the controlling shareholder and for the other (minority) shareholders. This difference in value is known as the private benefits of control. One empirical measure of these benefits is the "block premium," which is the difference between the price per share paid in a block transaction and the market price after the transaction. The first column of Table 2 shows that block premiums are somewhat larger in Germany and much larger in Italy than in the United States, the United Kingdom, or France. Another measure is the "voting premium," which is the difference between the market prices of voting and non-voting shares. The second column of Table 2 shows that the voting premium is much higher in France and Italy, moderate in Germany and the United Kingdom, and low in the United States. These results suggest that the value of control is larger in continental Europe than in the US and the UK.
[Insert Table 2 Bank of America soon replied that there was no such account, Parmalat Finanziaria was declared insolvent, and Calisto Tanzi was jailed.
According to an estimation of the sources and uses of funds reported in Table 3 , from 1990 to December 2003 the Parmalat group used a total of $18.2 billion of financial resources, including $16.9 billion raised from debt. Over that period of time the family siphoned off (in "unknown" uses) about $3 billion. This is a lower bound of the expropriation, because overpayment for the acquisition of assets would be classified as acquisitions or other capital expenditures. Most of these resources were transferred to the other businesses directly owned by the Tanzis. The techniques used to conceal the fraud were rudimentary. Parmalat hid losses, overstated assets (and recorded non-existent ones), understated debt, forged bank documents and diverted cash to the Tanzi family.
[Insert Table 3 approx. here] As in any large financial scandal, the designated watchdogs (auditors, investment banks and regulators) are partly to blame for not detecting the patterns of negligence, fraud and corruption. However, Parmalat is mainly an example of outright expropriation of both shareholders and creditors by a family that treated company resources as their own. Although it represents an extreme case (given the scale of the expropriation), the evidence on private benefits of control reported in Table 2 indicates that minor forms of expropriation are systemic in continental Europe.
There is an important difference between financial scandals in companies with concentrated ownership (like Parmalat) and in those with diffused ownership (like Enron and Worldcom). In Enron and Worldcom (as well as in Vivendi and Royal Ahold, two European widely held companies) corporate managers engaged in earnings manipulation and accounting irregularities, in order to inflate the stock price and gain from their equity and options holdings. In Parmalat (as well as in Adelphia, a US company with concentrated ownership), the controlling shareholders expropriated investors of corporate resources via self-dealing. As Coffee (2005) argues, these differences must lead to different regulatory responses in different countries.
Four Legal Tools
Dominant shareholders (and insiders more generally) have good opportunities to expropriate investors. Can this problem be solved without regulation, namely via private contracting and social norms? From the available evidence, the answer is no. For instance, we know that countries with weaker investor protection have less developed financial markets (La Porta et al., 1997 and and that weaker insider trading legislation and enforcement is associated with higher cost of capital (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2001) . Because finance matters for growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), financial regulation matters. In this section, we briefly describe four legal tools that are commonly used to protect investors. In the following section, we discuss the evolution of these tools in the three major economies of continental Europe -France, Germany and Italy -and compare it with the US.
Strengthening Internal Governance Mechanisms
The board of directors is the primary institution of corporate governance. Its main task is to hire and monitor top management on behalf of shareholders, and it is best placed to screen related-party transactions. Whether firms are widely held or family-controlled, the danger is that, rather than represent the interests of faceless shareholders, boards will bond with management, whom they interact with regularly, or the family, who has the ultimate power to select and remove them.
Regulations mandating greater independence for directors and defining the board's functions, powers and internal workings -including matters like auditing, setting executive compensation, screening related-party transactions, and disclosure of information flowsmay give the board of directors some power to challenge the dominant shareholder. So far, though, there is little evidence that these reforms have curbed controlling shareholders' abuses (Denis and McConnell, 2003) .
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Empowering Shareholders
The law traditionally protects shareholders by enhancing their rights to sell, sue and vote. First, in widely held companies, the shareholders' right to sell their shares allows for a market for corporate control to emerge as a mechanism to limit insider abuses (Manne, 1965) .
Where ownership is highly concentrated, as in continental Europe, this market only disciplines the insiders of the relatively few companies that are widely held (Rossi and Volpin, 2004) .
Second, regulators may empower shareholders by granting them the right to sue the company and its directors. The effect of such suits will depend on how easy or costly it is to bring them and how efficient the court system is.
Third, regulation can empower shareholders by giving them a say over key corporate governance issues. For this purpose, regulators can extend the subject matters to be decided by the shareholder meeting, mandate super-majority requirements, lower the cost of voting, limit deviations from one-share-one-vote, and mandate minority shareholders' representation on the board. The evidence in Djankov et al. (2006) indicates that shareholders' right to vote on self-dealing transactions is particularly important.
Control transactions may also provide the occasion for self-dealing (see Kirchmaier and Grant, 2005) . Controlling shareholders may reject value-maximizing takeovers (if they are not fully compensated for the foregone private benefits of control), and accept valuedestroying ones that let them appropriate the control premium (see Bebchuk, 1994 , also for an extensive discussion of the trade-off between investor protection via equal treatment clauses and efficiency of the market for corporate control). The law can protect minority shareholders by allowing them to share the control premium with majority shareholders (so as to align controlling and minority shareholders' incentives).
Enhancing Disclosure Requirements
Whether shareholders effectively exercise their rights to sell, vote and sue effectively depends on their access to information. An extensive regime of disclosure may help alleviate agency problems in listed corporations: as Louis Brandeis (1914, p. 62) once famously wrote, sunshine is "the best of disinfectants." For example, mandatory disclosure of related-party transactions and of directors' compensation can be an effective tool to limit self-dealing by those in control. Disclosure of price-sensitive information helps prevent insider trading. Welldesigned accounting standards and independent and skilful audits can detect Parmalat-style frauds early on.
Tougher Public Enforcement
Another type of regulatory intervention is enforcement of corporate and securities laws through supervisory agencies and criminal sanctions. There is not much evidence that public enforcement matters (Djankov et al., 2006 ). Yet it may be the most effective tool to prevent specific forms of expropriation, like insider trading, which are otherwise hard to detect. It may also be needed to impose sufficiently severe sanctions, like prison terms, in extreme cases.
Corporate Governance Reforms in France, Germany and Italy
In the last fifteen years reforms have been enacted in France, Germany and Italy to improve internal governance mechanisms, empower shareholders, enhance disclosure and strengthen public enforcement. To understand the impact of these reforms, it is helpful to start by describing the status quo in comparison with the US.
In the United States the directors make all the decisions (or have an exclusive power to initiate them if a shareholder vote is mandated). In Europe shareholders have a final say on a larger number of issues, such as share buy-backs, dividend payments and new issues.
European shareholders also have much greater power to set the shareholder meeting agenda (Cools, 2005) . This allocation of power backs up the prevailing ownership structures: in both cases, the law grants the controllers (management in the US, dominant shareholders in Europe) the right to exercise and retain control.
The US central government has long played a much more important role in regulating corporate governance than the European Community on the other side of the Ocean: US securities regulation has developed since the thirties and now deals with many crucial corporate governance issues, such as shareholder meetings and voting, insider trading, takeovers, securities fraud, and now, with the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), even board in widely held corporations (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) . composition and functioning (Roe, 2003) . By contrast, the European Community, despite its power to enact binding laws (called regulations and directives) in corporate law matters, has traditionally had a much lower impact on European companies' corporate governance (Enriques, 2006) . Furthermore, US securities regulation provides for a system of mandatory disclosure that is traditionally far more comprehensive than Europe's. Its effectiveness is ensured by an aggressive set of enforcement institutions, such as the securities plaintiff bar (i.e. lawyers who bring class action suits on behalf of large numbers of investors), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice. In Europe, enforcement is in the hands of Member States, which have traditionally been far from aggressive in tackling violations of corporate and securities laws via public enforcement. With no plaintiff bar and long-standing legal hurdles to shareholder litigation, private enforcement of directors' duties was almost unheard of. This is in sharp contrast with the US, where corporate directors face a high risk of being sued if they engage in self-dealing. When this happens, the courts, especially in Delaware, are very strict in judging a director's loyalty to the corporation.
While there are features common to the various continental European corporate governance systems, especially compared with the US, each also has its own distinctive traits.
German law mandates a two-tier board structure, made up of a "supervisory board" and a "managerial board." In companies with more than 2,000 employees, the supervisory board must be composed of equal numbers of shareholder-elected and employee-chosen members In France, managerial power has historically been concentrated in the hands of the chief executive officer, who, by law, also acted as chairman of the board. At least on paper, corporate law has traditionally been friendlier to minority shareholders in France than in Germany or Italy. Two mention but two instances, individual shareholders of French companies have since long been able to sue directors derivatively and a special regime has always applied to related-party transactions involving board members: these transactions need to be approved by the board and ratified by the shareholder meeting, unless they are deemed to be routine transactions (i.e., "current transactions entered into at normal conditions"). In general, however, judges and practitioners have traditionally provided a mild interpretation of this regime, e.g. by qualifying most transactions with companies of a same group as routine ones (Enriques, 2004) .
In Italy, a separate board of auditors, i.e. an internal body composed exclusively of formally independent members, has traditionally performed the internal audit functions.
Neither the board of directors nor the board of auditors have ever been able to exercise There have been three main drivers of continental European corporate governance reforms over the last two decades. First, reforms aimed to make national capital markets more attractive at a time when international competition for equity capital was increasing due to deregulation and globalization and States were engaging in privatizations (Kamar, 2006) . Second, especially on disclosure issues, changes were spurred as part of the European Community's efforts to institute a common regulatory framework for European financial markets (Ferran, 2004 In Germany, the 1998 reform was geared to improve internal corporate governance by redefining the functioning of both the management board and the supervisory board. The management board now has to ensure that adequate risk management and internal audit systems are in place and must report to the supervisory board over risk management issues, budget and business plans. Supervisory boards have to meet at least four times a year and have an increased role in the choice of, and relationship with, the auditor.
French law has done little to empower the board of directors, other than to allow companies to separate the roles of chairman of the board and chief executive officer. Some attempts were made to give more information to directors from outside the firm. In 2001, a new law stated that "each director should receive all information needed to fulfill his duties"
and that "each director can obtain any and all documents that he sees fit to request" (Menjucq, 2005, p. 702) . But two years later, French lawmakers scrapped the latter provision, preventing individual board members from accessing the company's documents directly.
In Italy, the 1998 reforms have strengthened the board of directors by requiring that executive directors regularly inform the board of directors and the board of auditors of business developments and related-party transactions, and, most importantly, that at least one director and one board of auditors member be elected by minority shareholders. The reforms also entrusted the board of auditors with greater powers and somewhat tightened their members' independence requirements. [Insert Table 4 approx. here]
Empowering Shareholders
In the US, pressure from shareholder activists has led to more powerful shareholders' In each of the three countries, shareholders now have lower costs for voting. shareholders remain free to sell their shares up until the day before the meeting.
To limit the power of controlling shareholders, special majorities for "non-routine"
shareholder resolutions have traditionally been in place in France and Germany. In Italy, since 1998, a two-thirds majority of the shares represented at the meeting has been required for various kinds of resolution, including new issues, mergers, and amendments to the bylaws. The purpose is to allocate some power to large minority shareholders, in hopes that they monitor the controlling shareholder.
France and Italy also lowered the ownership thresholds for some minority shareholder rights, such as the right to call a meeting (from 10 to 5 percent and from 20 to 10 percent, respectively) or to ask a court to appoint an expert for the review of transactions (from 10 to 5 percent in both countries).
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Of these three countries, Germany has done the most to limit deviations from the oneshare-one-vote principle, but Italy has also taken steps in this direction. Germany banned multiple-voting shares in 1998, and also prohibited banks from acting as clients' proxy if they own more than 5 percent of the shares. More generally, the rules on banks' voting of clients'
shares were revised to discourage the clients' tendency to let banks decide freely on how to vote and hence, as a rule, support management. Finally, in 2002 Germany revised its tax code to exempt capital gains from sales of shareholdings held by corporations. The aim was to encourage firms and financial institutions to disentangle their cross-shareholdings. Italy did the same in 2003. In both countries the exemption also applies to newly acquired holdings, so that it is not obvious that it should lead to a lower number of corporate shareholdings. In fact, while in Germany firms did disentangle their cross-shareholdings, a process that was already under way when the tax-break was enacted (Fohlin, 2005) , in Italy the tax-break was followed by an increase in the number of corporate block-holdings (Bianchi and Bianco, 2006) .
Italy also reformed its corporate law to counter various forms of deviation from oneshare-one-vote. In 1998 the so-called "Draghi Law" tackled shareholder agreements -that is, pacts among blockholders to set a common voting policy and/or restrict their freedom to sell shares. These agreements, which are very common in Italy's large listed companies, stabilize control in the hands of the blockholders, who are often linked by a web of cross-holdings (Ferrarini, 2001 ). The 1998 law introduced a three-year time limit for these agreements, so that parties are free to back off from them every three years. The law also provides that in the event of a takeover bid the parties are free to tender their shares, no matter what restrictions the agreements would impose on their sale.
Another mechanism by which shareholders can have more say is private enforcement by shareholder lawsuits. Germany and Italy have enacted reforms favoring derivative suits, i.e. shareholder actions for damages against directors on behalf of the corporation.
In Italy, derivative suits were first permitted in 1998, but standing to sue was restricted to shareholders holding at least 5 percent of the shares. No derivative action has yet been brought, probably because of this high threshold and to other hurdles, such as the fact that the losing party in a suit has to pay the winner's lawyer fees and that it is almost impossible for shareholder plaintiffs to obtain the evidence they need to substantiate their claim, in the absence of US-style rules providing for pre-trial discovery (Enriques, 2004) . However, Italy has made some changes. Contingency fees (lawyers' fees that are owed only if the client wins or settles) were made legal in 2006, and the threshold for a shareholder suit was reduced to 2.5 percent in 2005. 5 Further, minority shareholders have been granted the right to sue the parent company for damages, if it has abused its control powers.
Of the three countries, Germany has enacted the most extensive revisions to encourage US-style shareholder litigation. For example, rules introduced in 2005 make it possible for shareholders representing at least 1 percent of shares or shares worth at least €100,000
(approximately $125,000) to bring a derivative suit against directors. Settlement agreements have to be disclosed to the public, and a special regime on lawyers' fees more favorable to plaintiff shareholders has been introduced.
Germany also enacted rules to facilitate shareholder suits for damages stemming from violations of issuers' duty to disclose material information. Such suits were first allowed in 2003. Two years later, procedural rules were introduced to facilitate securities class action lawsuits. No such procedural rules exist in Italy or in France.
European lawmakers have also been active in the field of control transactions. All three countries have introduced a "mandatory bid rule": that is, the acquirer of a control block must offer to acquire all the remaining shares at a price usually above market.
[Insert Table 5 approx. here]
Enhancing Disclosure Requirements
The regulatory framework for disclosure has improved on both sides of the Atlantic.
After the scandals, the US imposed additional disclosure obligations and enhanced the role of auditors (Coates, 2007) . In continental Europe in the last 15 years major disclosure reforms have been enacted, that mainly cover four spheres: 1) corporate governance; 2) self-dealing and insider trading; 3) compensation; 4) financial reporting.
In France, companies are required to disclose corporate governance arrangements in a detailed report, which must also state whether they comply with the relevant Corporate Governance Code. In Italy companies must declare whether they comply with the stock exchange corporate governance code, in Germany with the official code. Companies from continental European countries used to accumulate hidden reserves due to conservative accounting policies. Under the new IFRS rules on financial reporting, the principle of "fair value accounting" forces companies to disclose such reserves. As a consequence, investors should be better able to understand whether companies retain excessive cash in the effort to maximize the size of the firm and the private benefits that size can bring.
Disclosure of self-dealing
Finally, continental European jurisdictions have also taken steps to strengthen auditors' independence and effectiveness, similar to the U.S. rules imposed under SOX (see Table 6 for details).
[Insert Table 6 approx. here]
Tougher Public Enforcement
By international standards, the United States has very strict public enforcement of corporate governance rules, which the post-scandal reforms have made even tougher: the US congress granted, by raising SEC resources, increasing criminal sanctions for fraud and setting up a public body to supervise auditors, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (Coates, 2007) .
France, Germany and Italy have all reshaped and strengthened their public enforcement structures in the past 15 years. Germany has done the most in this area, for the remarkable reason that prior to 1994 it had no authority for supervising securities markets. Germany has thus had to build it up from scratch. Italy has granted Consob greater powers. France, which already had a powerful public enforcement agency in place, merged (like Germany) all its financial supervision into one authority, the AMF (BaFin in Germany). [Insert Table 7 approx. here]
Conclusion
Corporate governance in continental Europe traditionally differs from that in the US in two important ways. First, most European companies have controlling shareholders, while most American corporations are widely held; second, the regulations on self-dealing have traditionally been stricter in the US.
In the last 15 years the three largest continental European countries (France, Germany and Italy) have enacted significant corporate law reforms to strengthen the mechanisms of internal governance, empower shareholders, enhance disclosure requirements and toughen public enforcement. Special emphasis was placed on empowering minority shareholders and on disclosure, which are the most effective tools for countering abuses by dominant shareholders.
However, there are two caveats to the conclusion that as a consequence of the reforms investors are actually better off. First of all, far too little has been done to resolve the problem of related-party transactions, which is the most common form of self-dealing for dominant shareholders in Europe. Germany has done nothing to improve its law on this matter. France and Italy have introduced stricter rules on such transactions but have not done enough to strengthen private enforcement, which is an absolute necessity for giving these rules "teeth,"
making them effective in the real world, not just in the statute books. In other words, there is a serious risk that these rules will be better only on paper.
Second, a good part of the European reforms have been patterned after US corporate and securities law. This is only natural, in light of America's well-developed legal framework for corporate governance, which has been further improved by the post-scandal reforms, and the success of the US economy over the last two decades. However, the fundamental differences in ownership structure between Europe and the US mean that emulating laws whose focus is on curbing managerial opportunism may not be an appropriate way to prevent self-dealing by controlling shareholders. Indeed, to be cynical one might observe that politically it may be a kind of "path of least resistance" for European policymakers to adopt US-style solutions designed to tackle managerial agency problems. This way, they can appear to be doing something to reform corporate governance while actually leaving the rents of dominant shareholders perfectly intact.
In view of its recent evolution, corporate governance law in Europe is often described as being in a "state of permanent reform" (Noack and Zetzsche, 2005) . The reform effort needs to continue if continental Europe is to address in an effective manner the basic problems of corporate governance that are posed by the power of dominant shareholders. 
